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1. Introductictn 
Nearly the entire theoretical literature on the effects of the ‘brain drain’ from 
the less developed countries on their welfare has. been undert.aken i the frame- 
work of neoclassical models of the Hicks-Samuelson value-theoretic variety.’ 
While the analysts in this genre have greatly clarified certain issues uch as the 
nature of the objective function to be specified, their analysis and prescriptions 
have been constrained by the theoretical model which the:y work with. The 
central result of their analysis, attributable to Grubel and Scott (1966), that 
brain drain prima facie should not be a cause for worry as the drained person 
will only take away the value of his marginal product which he himself earns 
anyway, can be rather obviously shown to be subject o the limitations that (i) for 
finite, rather than infinitestimal, shifts of labour, there woulld still be a loss to 
those left bel~ind;2 (ii) if the social marginal product exceeds the private marginal 
‘product, thanks to strong externalities, as would seem to be the case with doctors 
and exceptionally gifted academics about whose emigration typically the under- 
developed countries eem to worry, then again there i.7 a loss to those left behind; 3 
*Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation for financial support of the research 
underlying this paper. The paper was written while K. Hamnda (University of Tokyo, Runkyo- 
ku, Tokyo) was visiting M.I.T. on a F’ellowship from the American Council of Learned 
Societies. Helpful comments on the paper were received from ‘T.N. Srinivasan, Robert Solo!v, 
Herbert Grubel and an anonymous referee. Bhagwati is Visiting Forcl Research Professor 
at University of California, Berkeiey, for 1973-1974. 
‘See, in particular, Grubel and Scott (1966) and Johnson (1972). 
*On the other hand, depending on the size of the emigration and the nature of the production 
function, this loss may still be very small. 
30n the other hand, ace could stretch things a great deal and argue that, for some emigrants, 
their contribution to social product still continues to accrue to the home country: e.g. ;1n 
Indian scientist’s achievements abroad ‘inspire’ his countrymen at home; and that this happens 
without heir earning their private: product from the home-country’s GNP and also that lheir 
social product mdy even increase if their achievements improve in a more efficient and produc- 
tive environment han the one found in their home country. 
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and (iii) if the State has financed the education which is embodied in the skilled 
worker who migrates, an$ if it is assumed that the State would have taxed this 
skilled worker - 2 realistic assumption when there is progressive taxation - 
partially or wholly to ‘recover’ the return on this investment, hen his emigration 
does depri?,e those left behind of this return and thus worsens their welfare. 
These are useful insights into the problem of the ‘brain drain’. However, 
admittedly, the analysis is overly simple and could be extended in many 
directions. An obvious growth-theoretic extension would be to bring in savings 
behaviour and maximization of welfare over time for those left behind. Or, 
with:;n the confines of the Hicks-Samuelson model, the analysis could be 
enriched to allow for remittances from the emigrated people: an argument 
which qualifies the conclusions in favour of permitting the brain drain. The 
neoclassical model could further be extended fur/y in the direction of trade- 
theoretic models with factor movements: the effect of th,e labour migration on 
the commodity terms of trade of the labour-losing country could be readily 
analysed along the lines of the recent Jones (1967) and Kemp ( 1966) contributions 
to the welfare theory of international capital movements.4 
But few of these extensions of the Hicks-Samuelson value-theoretic model are 
anything but analytic modifications which admit into the model the kinds of 
complexities which the model itself, rather than reality, suggests. It is necessary 
therefore to see whether an alternative value-theoretic model can be devised 
which comes closer to reality as observed in certain underdeveloped countries. 
In particular, certain important aspects of t+e educated-manpower problem 
in Lnderdeveloped countries have been noted by the uon-theorists: 
(1) The presence of international income-inequality implies that, for the 
educated elite which is better informed about the developed world, and more 
integrated therewith regarding notions of a ‘good life’ and related values, the 
salary levels demanded and fixed by the elite groups themselves tend to reflect 
the salary levels of comparable groups in the more developed countries. Rend 
Dumont (1969) has argued for French Africa : 
‘During the last phase of colonialism, the policy was to equalize salaries 
of Africans and Europeans in similar jobs, a defensible position only in the 
framework of ‘assimilation’. The native civil servant, in addition to his regular 
salary, received a colonial supplement. This has been reduced in some cases, 
but not abolishc,d. At independence, this pseudoequality has led to flagrant 
disparity with the rest of the population, whose standard of living is often a 
fifteenth of the French. 
4Johnson (1967) has extended the analysis af the problem in a yet different direction, by 
essummg tilat skilled-labour migration recluces both the labour anil the capital stock of the 
emigrating country. Howevtzr, hisanalysis is limited by his assumption that human capital and 
physical capital are perfect substitutes - an assumption that would naturally provide a down- 
ward bias to the damaging effects of brain drain. 
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Massive departure of the French resulted i I a high rate of promotion of 
subordinate African civil servants, who thus ca #n even more now than before, 
for the sa’me qualifications. The student returi!ing from France is appointed 
director if he is the only African technician o.r graduate in his field.’ (p. 80) 
Indeed, this phenomenon has been noted by Osvaldo Sunlcel (1971) for Latin 
America. and by Dudley Seers and Richard Jolly (1972) for a wider group of 
countrie,s. Thus, .we can postulate a saiio-economic situation in which the real 
wage levels of the educated elites are set by fiat, legislation, unionisation, etc., 
at levels which reilect the degree of response to the international-elite-integration 
effect just outlined. 
(2) This phenomenon of educated-elite wages, ‘way out of line with the 
average per capita income of the underdeveloped countries’, is next regarded as 
often leading to a ‘leap-frogging’ process under which the lowest wages tend 
to get pulled up by the highest: hence the phenomenon of such institutionally 
defined wages tends to run through the entire labour-market. 
(3) With these institutionally defined wages, it is Levitable that the labour- 
market must work so as to have open unemployment of labour (except in 
singular cas’es); and this too is an observed phenomenon: educated and also 
uneducated people are often unemployed in the developed countries. 
(4) At thle same time, the phenomenon off high wages, accruing to the 
(employed) educated elite, creates a political demand for education. Rcne 
Dumont (1969) has again described the French African situation vividly: 
Present edrrcatiou obstrwcts progress 
“This statement may appear para8doxical to many readers, particularly 
coming from the pen of a professor, since education was the essential founda- 
tion of development in Europe, America, Japan, the Soviet Union and China. 
In Africa it has a certain utility, but. this is greatly curtailed by the social 
milieu on to which the educational system was grafted. For most African 
children, in town and country alike, school rey,resents above all a means of 
entering the elite class. Even in the most backward areas of the bush everyone 
has grasped the fact that the official with clean hands earns more and works 
much less. 
Pushed by his parents, a peasant child realizes that he can never go very 
far in agriculture ; the only way to get aheat! is to get out. He goes to 
school and works very hard, to this end, sometimes at the price of incredible 
sacrifices. I have heard of a child in Chad who walks twice a day the twenty 
kilornetres eparating his house from school. 
. . . Before long, these young people end up in the shanty-towns of the 
capitals and become social parasites. Their days are spent writing requests 
for jobs, requests that pile up ’ ; all the administrations. Some of them, in 
Douala for example, join the unuerground.” (pp. 88-89) 
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But this is a situation which is to be found in a large number of underdeveloped 
countries, indeed. 
(5) And the,demand for education is translated into educational expenditures 
by the State, in these underdeveloped countries, with visible alacrity. In India, 
for example, the number of colleges expands, with little time lag, to accommodate 
the students who qualify with ‘passing marks’ from the high schools: and the 
standards in the latter have, in turn, fallen to accommodate the larger flows of 
students eeking educational qualifications. 
A value-theoretic model which accounts for these phenomena is clearly more 
relevant for analysis of the questions pertaining to the labour market, such as th.2 
welfare effect of the brain drain, in several underdeveloped countries shan the 
neoclassical model (which assumes fully flexible wages, for example). 
We proceed therefore to the construction oflprecisely such a model in sect. 2 
and then analyse the phenomena of brain dr,Cn and increasing international 
integration of elite groups ill its framework i.n sect. 3. In sect. 4, we discuss a 
number of variants of this basic model. In sect. 5, we draw together the welfare 
implications of emigration in the framework of our model and its variants, also 
examining the effects of taxing emigrants - a polic:‘, that has sometimes been 
advocated in the literature.’ In particular, since our m,Jdsl allows for the existence 
of unemployment for both educated and uneducated labour, our discussion of 
welfare will involve examination ot merely of the (conventional) impact on the 
domestic 8availability of goods and services for final use but also of the effect of 
each policy measure on the level and the degree of unemployment, if any, of 
edch class of labour. 6 
2. The basic model 
The simplest general equilibrium model, incorporating the features described 
above, which can be constructed for our analysis is set out below. 
.jssurr.e two commodlt.ies M, and m,. Let their outputs M, and M2 be related 
to the inputs by the following production functions which possess the standa:rd 
properties including twice differentiability and linear homogeneity, 
M, = MU (1) 
M2 = F,W,), (2) 
where L1 is the quantity of skilled/t:ducaterl labour employed in proiiucing m, , 
‘See, for example, Bhagwati and Dellallar (1973). 
“We might as well note explicitly that tile kind of model we build 2nd analyse n this paper 
is not universally valid, even on casual c t:prricism. Thus, for example, in Japan, Ihe (relative) 
wage level of intellectuals in Japan has mAnaged to remain virtually unaffected by the signifi- 
cantly higher level of remuneration for their counterparts in the West. This may be one of the 
many respects in which Japan has apparently differed from the other ‘latecomers in the process 
of industrialization and integration of the world economy and polity, e:<hibiting a remarkable 
ability to adhere to an ‘inaer-directed’ pos:ure in her political and cultural methods. 
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and E, is the quantity of unskilled,4.meducatcd labour emplo!,ed in producing 
m2. Note that educated liabour e:nters only m,-production and uneducated 
labour enters only m,-production. Diminishing returns to L1 and L, are postu- 
lated, implying implicit, specific ‘non-labour’ factors. We further assume that 
the country is a ‘small’ country, in Samuelson’s ense, so that the commodity 
price ratio p1/,p2 := 7c is exogenously fixed and commodity m, is the numeraire. 
We next assume that the re?l wage of educated labour is fixed,, by international 
emulation and associated union-fixation or wage legislation, at level E, in 
m,-units. Note th[at his au.tomaticaliy defines (8’I/X,IIn and hence L1 and M, . 
Similarly, assume that the ‘leap-frogging’ process fixed the minimum wages of 
unskilled labour ,Cz. at E2 (= JF2/&), and hence also L2 and FM,. Thus we can 
write the following two factor market equations: 
c7I;‘,$E, = i$/x, or L, = &we (3) 
a17;;/cx2 = ii$, or Lz = lm2). (4) 
Then with U, and. U, denoting the unemployed, educated and uneducated labour 
respectively, NI and N2 denoting educated and rrneducated Iabour supply respec- 
tively, and R representing the total fixed labour supply, we have three balance 
equations :’
L, $7 rr, = Nl , (51 
L, -I- U, = N2, (6) 
N,-tN, = iJ. (7) 
IBut we next need to know how the available labour supply will divide between 
NI and N2. To do this, we need to introduce equations to determine the supply 
#of educated 1abot.u: N,, . We shall assume that there will be a positive inducement 
IO get educated as long as the *expected wage fbr educated labour exceeds the 
expected wage for uneducated labour. 
Let the expected wage for educated labour Ew, then be the acerage wage for it, 
namely, 
EWI = %(L,lNA 6% 
and the expecteld wage for uneducated labour E&v2 be the average wage )r it : 
Ew2 = K2(L2/N2), (9 
‘BhagwAi and Srinivasan (1972) have analysed an alternative adjustment mechanism for the 
labour marker, where the unemployment of skilled labo:lr is not permitted as long as there are 
enough ,jobs in the unskilled labour market. Under this theory, the available supply of skilled 
labour first gets absorbed in the skilled labour market, and the spil!lover then takes the available 
jobs in the unskilled labour market (where the two kinds of labour are equally productive but 
the employers sociologicalLy prefer giving jobs to skilled over unskilled applicants). The 
Bhagwati-Srinivasan rn~cizl is designed to study the phenorlenon of ‘overqualification’, 
whereby the educated SW- to get into the uneducated-level jobs over time: a phenomenon 
which has sometimes alz lxxn called the ‘upgrading’ of jobs. 
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and ths equilibrium condition then is: 
Note that this eouilibrium condition makes sense insofar as we are assuming that 
the State undertake the cost of education, and not labour itself. It is assumed 
therefore that as long as Ew, > Ew2, there wilI be a politically elective excess 
demand for State-financed educational facilities to be opened up, for N, to be 
turned into N, until Ew, = Ew,. However, to analyze the effect of this assump- 
tion on the level of nat;rnal income, we may simply subtract the cost of this 
education from national production of m, and m, to arrive at the national income 
available for consumption: 
Y = (Zk!i $ A42) -kN,, WI 
where k is the fixed educational cost, in m,-units, per person; this cost being 
subtracted from total output of Ml and M2 to arrive at the net output available 
for consumption Y.’ It follows that increasing Y is tantamount o increasing the 
value of a conventional social welfare function defined in terms of goods and 
services available for domestic onsumption. 
This basic model thus has eleven equations and eleven unknowns: M, , ikf2, 
L,, A?,, U,, U2, N1, N2, Ewl, Ew2, and Y. It is also a model in terms of which 
we can aaalyze meaningfully a number of questions relating to the brain drain 
problem and the phenomenon of international integration of the educated- 
labour markets. 
3. Brain drain and intwnatiooal integration of market for professionals 
This basic model can be easily contrasted with the case where both wages are 
flexible and labour pays for the cost of education. Note first that we have here 
tAree sources of economic inefficiency : the two sticky wages plus the free educa- 
tion. In the absence of these three inefficiencies, the economy would have reached 
the standard Pareto-optimalequilibrium with thefollowingfirst-order conditions: 
wl -k = (%‘,/dL,)- k = (LV’,/X,) = w2, (12) 
with full employment of labour. In analysing the model with the three in- 
efficiencies which we have noted, we now proceed through successive possi- 
bilities, analysing the effects on unemployment and national income in four 
alternative cases : 
Case I. Our-Joneses-keeping-up-with-their-Joneses: This is ihe case where the 
country’s educated/skilled labour, on integrating with the outside-world’s 
8To ensure proper dimertsionality in the analysis that follows, this educational cost must be 
re,garded as the ‘annual’ flaw-equivalent of the educational cost incurred to train a man. Also, 
to simplify the analysis, WI: do not introduce private educational expenditure until sect. 4. 
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educated/skilled. labour, demands and achieves an increment in its salary leve!: 
this is therefore the case where there is primary increase in ~‘i. 
Case II. Keeping-up-u)r the our-Jorleses : This is the case where we have the 
well-observed “leap-frogging’ process, so that the rise in \vI (the wage of skilled 
labourj leads to a sympathetic rise in w2 (,.he wage of unskilled labour). 
Ca,;e LX Einigration-c$omJoneses: Tins is the case where the emigration of 
skilled labour to higher-wage a.rea.s abroad leads to higher expected wage to 
skilled labour: either via :m:ore reduction in unemployment of skilled labour at 
home and consequent inmas~~di assurance of the domestic wage (ci;,) dr via 
pushing up the expected wag? lxcaruse the wage-rate abroad is higher than the 
domestic wage. 
Case 17. The general case of Semigration (and ri.st) of waqey: This is the general 
case where the emigration of’zkilled labour is also accompanied by a sympathetic 
rise in the domestic wage (Fr): a case that is plausible because more emigration 
c,;Ild imply more integration of the professional markets for skilled labour 
internationally. This general case therefore considers the totality of erects from 
Case II and Case III: the emigration effect of Casz 111 being combined with ehe 
dual wage-increase effect of Case II. 
We now analyse these casep .+ in turn. The following analysis is carried out on 
the assumption that a marginal change in wages or emigration still leaves some 
unemployment ineach sector; otherwise, neoclassical competitive analysis would 
become applicable. 
Case I. Our-jroneses-keeping-uy-Witli-their-Ji~)leses 
This is the case where the educated labour force is getting culturally integrated 
internationally, and the effect is to exercise an upward pull on its domestic 
salary level. This phenomenon of ‘our-Joneses-keeping-up-with-their-Joneses’ 
can be analysed simply then by analysing the effect of a shift in tipi. 
We can see the effect of the increase in W1 on employment by differentiating 
(3) and (4): 
The employment in m,-sector will decrease in response to the rise in wages in its 
own sector and the employment in m,-sector emains the same. 
However, unemployment .in both, sectors depends on how labour divides into 
the two types of labour. We can rieadily see the effect of the wage increase in 
m,-sector on the division of labour :supply into the two types, by deriving: 
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where Q = (i?I,X,)~dL,/di?,) is the elasticity of the demand for labour in 
nr,-industry. Further, (15) simplifies to : 
dN,/dit’, = (1 - YJ&V$V~/(~G,), 
or, in elasticity terms, 
(16) 
(~l/iVI)(dNI/d~I) = (1 - r#I,/ff. (17) 
Thus tbe supply of educated iabour increase? I I decrtyases depending on whether 
the elasticity of demand for latour in m,-indztry, is less or more than unity. 
This result is easy to understand, of course, because the outcome regarding the 
supply of educated labour depends on the impact effect of the wage change in m, 
on the expected wage (EN+) in that sector: and the expected wage will rise 
insofar :as the actual wage rises but fall incy*lfar as (educated) labour is laid off by 
profit-maximising entrepreneurs in m, in consequence. The net outcome is 
determined by whether the elasticity of demand for labour in ml is higher or 
lower than unity: in the former case, the net effect is to lower the expected wage 
Ew, ; in the latter case, the net effect is to increase it.’ 
We ca!n now analyze the effect on absolute and relative unemployment of each 
sector. 
(a) Absolute level of unemployment of educatedlabour 
(d/dG,)(N, 4,) = (I- ~&V,N,,‘(EJ)+ Q.,/G1. ua 
Thus if the elasticity of demand for educated labour is less than unity, the 
absolute level of unemployment increases because the supply of educated labour 
increases while the demand decreases. However, even if the elasticity of demand 
for educated labour is greater than unity, so that the supply of educated labour 
is reduced (owing to reduced expected wage Ew,), the absolute unemployment of 
educated labour would increase if the d:,: .and for such labour reduces even 
more ; this would be the case if:’ ’ 
-&IN, < NJ% but ‘11 < [1. -W,/N,)/(N,/~)l-‘. cw 
9At the same time, it is easy to see that the elasticity of demand for labour, ql, is the ratio of 
the elasticity cf substitut!on of the production function, u,, and the capital share, aI : 
We ma-y therefore restate the above proposition: !he supply 01 educated labour increases or 
decreases depending on whether the elasticity of substitution in n#r-industry issmaller or larger 
than the capital share in ml-industry. 
“This ‘:an be seen by rewriting eq. (18) as : 
(4’dwdW, -&I = I1 -VI c rl,(LIm/N~N*)}N~N2/0?‘1IJ). 
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In developing countries the elasticity of substitution in industrial sectors 
seems to be low, so that it is likely that the elasticity of demand for labour 
in Ini-sector is less than unity. Moreover, (22) is quite likely to b,z satisfied unless 
the unemployment rate in m,-industry is extremely high. Therefore, we can 
conclude rF;at he absolute unemployment in educated labour will most probably 
increase if the Isage of educated labour increases. 
(b) Relative tmrwployment of educated labour 
Similarly, from (14) and (17), we can derive: 
(21;l 
Thus the relatilre unemployment of educated labour will alw;tys increase when 
the wage in m,-,industry increases. 
(c) UnempIoynient of uneducated Iabour 
Since the employment of uneducated labour depends on its unchanged wage, 
it will clearly n>t change. However, the unemployment of uneducated laibour will 
increase or dec:rease, depending on whether the supply of uneducated labour 
increases or dccreascs. Thus if q1 < I!, so that t.he resulting improvement in 
Ew, has led to increase in educated labour, the stock of uneducated labour (iv,) 
will have been reduced and hence also the unemployment o.f ulieducated labour. 
Similarly, if q1 :> 1, the unemployment of uneducated labour will have increased. 
(dj National hcome 
?Jext, it is ea sly to see that: 
(22) 
National income will therefore change, when G1 rises, because c>f two effects: 
(i) the decline in employment of (educated) labour will diminish output of “I 
without any o:‘f’set from increment in output in m2 where the employment has 
not changed; .rnd (ii) the cost of educating labour will change, depending on 
whether the supply of educated labour increases or decreases. Clearly, therefore, 
when q1 < 1, T he increase in the supply of educated labour will work to accen- 
tuate the redL ction in income from the first effect: thus the result must be 
unnml>iguousl.I to reduce national income, as is evident from (22). Moreover, 
even ii’we take the other case where ql > 1, provided that condition (19) or (210) 
is satisfied afici rG < Wr , the net eiYece will be to reduce national income, again as 
is evident fron (22). The only case when income will increase is where k is Iarge, 
Q is extremciqr large and the initial unemployment rate of educated labour is 
large and violates eq. (19). The results in this cas: are summarized under the 
column (Effect I) in table 1. 
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Case II. Keeping-up-with-our-Joneses 
The next question we ask is what happens if the rise in W, leads, in turn, to a 
sympathetic rise in i?$ uiu the well-observed ‘leap-frogging’ process : this may be 
called the ‘keeping-up-with-our-own-Joneses’ phenomenon. We i:an indeed 
explore all the questions considered for Case I, for the case where both ii+ and 
G2 rise. 
The effect on employment in m,-sector naturally remains the same as above; 
but there is now an additional negative effect on employment in m,-sector, 
thanks to the induced rise in w2. Instead of (14) we have 
(23) 
Thus, defining dG2/d$ = e(e > 0) and q2 = --(5,/L,)(dL,/dCj,), we get the 
results tabulated in tabie 1. 
In addition Ito the effect hrough the rise in w1 (Effect I), the effect hrough the 
rise in w2 (Effect II) is superimposed. 
Note that, in contrast to Case I, the directions of the impacta are ambiguous 
because the induced rise in iG2 can of&et the eirects of the primary increase in Gr . 
Take, for example, the impact of the increase in Wr on the level of the educated 
labour force (IV,). For Effect I, the level of Nr will rise if ql < 1; however, for 
Effect II, the induced rise in W2, implying 0 > 0, will work to reduce nrl if 
t/2 < 1, thus making the dire&ion of the combined effect indeterminate. An 
interesting implication of the impact on national income in the last row of 
table 1 is that it is more difficult to exclude the possibility of increased income 
from the process of wage-increases. For example, take the extreme case where 
‘11 = rl2 = 0, and diG1 = di?, , i.e. 8 = 1. Then 
In this special case where the elasticities are zero, and where the factor intensities 
are consequently fixed, the simultaneous wage rise will increase national income 
because less people will get educated, thus reducing the cost of education, u+ile 
employment in each sector is kept constant. 
Case III. Emigration-&our-Joneses 
We can now turn to the issue of act.ual emigration of educated labour. We 
can set up the problem by assuming an exogenous emigration of educated 
labour, Z, which does not in itself lead to a simuitaneous rise in the (actual) 
wage KQ libr educated labour; only in Case IV will we consider the fully general 
case where the emigrartion causes rise in W, as also an induced rise in W2 as 
per Case II. 
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Eq. (5) must then be rewritten as: 
L1+U,+Z = I?,, (241 
so that the total educated labour is now the sum of domestically employed and 
unemployed plus emigrated labour.‘r 
There are alternative ways in which. we can explore now the impact of such 
emigration on the system, but all of them must operate through the primary 
impact on expected wage in the educated-labour market. Let us take three 
possibilities. 
(I): We may assume that the migration of a few educated members of the 
working force does not have any impact on the expected wage, as the migration 
is not wa,ge-induced and does not lead to similar expectations. Then, in this 
singular case, as long US the migration of labour still leaves some unemployment 
of educated labour, the division of labour into the two types of labour is 
unaffected, so that the only effect is a reduction in the unemployment of educated 
labour. Clearly, moreover, production and national income are unchanged, 
However, since per-capita income and the relative employment rate of educated 
labour are increased, social welfare should be increased by the ‘brain drain’ for 
any reasonable social welfare function. If, therefore, the migration is welfare- 
improving for the migrants -an assumtstion that seems reasonable i.f they are 
pursuing self-interest - the emigration is a ‘good’ event, causing welfare improve- 
ment for both the migrants and those left behind. 
(II): But this ‘wel!-behaved’ result will no longer carry through if we assume 
that the expected wage to educated labour will improve with the migration. This 
may happen in at least two plausible ways. Either the emigration may be treated 
as reducing the unemployment in the market for educated labour, so that the 
emigration is treated as raising the wage merely by increasing the number 
emplo:yed, without taking into consideration the incremental wage accruing to 
those employed abroad as distinct from those employed at ho!ne: this may be 
called the incrcmenftaf-enzljloymenI-e%rect variant of the model. hknatiuely, we 
may assume that the fact that the emigrants earn a differentially higher wage 
also alfects the expected wage: this may be called the incrc~mentul-employmen!- 
and-difirential-wage variant. We examine the former variant first. 
For the incremental-employment variant, the effect of the emigration is to 
change the equation for the expected wage in ml as 
Ew, = igi(L, +Z)/N, . (25) 
“We should note here the delicate problem of the timing of educalion and emigration. 
There would be little difficulty of interpretation, however, if we regard thss analysis as the 
comparison of two stationary states with and without migration, or more precisely one with 
some migration and the other with marginal increase in migraticn. 
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Thus the division of total labour between the two groups (educated and un. 
educated) is determined now by : 
C,(L, +.Z)/N, = fi$L:g+i2. (26) 
Noting that the emy?oyment of labour in neither sector is affected by dZ, we can 
next show tha.t 
dlk;/dZ = N,N,/(& +Z)NI}. (27) 
We thus see, from (27), that the increase of educated labour supply will be less 
than the amount of migration of educated labour if (L, +Z)/.N, > N&V [which 
is a relation very similar to (19) earlier]. Thus, under ?he above inequality- the 
unemployment of educated labour increases, and the unemployment of un- 
educ;ued labour decreases, due to the effect of an increase in IV;.’ 2 
The effect on national inctime is quite simply: 
dY/dZ = -k(dN,ldZ). (28) 
National income is seen, from (213), to diminish unambiguously because of the 
cost of educating the increment in educated labour. 
But we may *Yell ask Twhat happens to per-capita income, as the total amount of 
labour in the system is diminished too. Now, clearly: 
Hence, if kN,/ Y < (L, -I-Z)N, , for example, the average jncome will increase 
with the eaigration. That is, if the ratio of the hypothetical educational cost of 
training all uneducated labour to national income is smaller than the employ- 
ment rate of educated labour, the national income per labour will increase. 
Another way of looking at it is to see that d( Y/(m-Z))/dZ :> 0 if k(dN,/dZ) a: 
Y/@-Z), i.e. the per-capita income would increase if the increase in the educa- 
tion cost is less than the per-capita income. 
(III): We may finally explore the incremental-emplo,yment-and-d.#erential- 
wage variant. We thus assume now that the labour force wlill indeed take into 
“If the unemployment is defined as UJN, := 1 -(L, +2)/N,, we can show that 
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account he foreign wage level at which the emigrants get hired. If we then denote 
the foreign wage as &, we can write the expected wage in m, as: 
EW, = (ic,L, 4- iGfZ)pv, . (29) 
In this case, we now can derive the following modified results: 
dY/dZ = -k(dN,/dZ) = - k53,N, N,/{N&L, -t. %,Z)} . (31) 
It is then easy to see that the change in the level of the educated labour force 
(NJ in the new equilibrium will readily exceed the emigration if ii;, is large 
enough relative to i3, . Therefore in the case when the high wage rate in foreign 
countries is taken account of in assessing the expected wage ra. e, it is quite 
probable that unemploymcsnt i  educated sector increases in both absolute and 
relative sense. 
In addition, as is evident from (31), zational income will go down; and it is 
easy to see that the possibility of decreasing per-capita income as well is more 
likely than before. 1’ Therefore in the society whose welfare function depends on 
per-capita income and unemployment rates, national welfare will quite possibly 
go down unless the evaluation of reducing unemployment rate in the m,-sector 
more than offsets the loss due to decreasing per-capita income and increasing 
unemployment in the m,-sector. 
Case IV. Tile general case of .?migration 2nd rise c f wages 
If the wage of educated labour is rigidly fixed because it reflects the salary 
levels of comparable groups iu the more developed countries, it is quite con- 
ceivable that P1 itself is affected by the amount of migration of educated labour. 
The more migration there is, the more then could be the upward pull from the 
internationalization of this educated elite to domestic wage fixation. This rise 
in ‘Y, may in turn trigger additlonal wage rise in Ez, as analyzed in Case II. 
Thus the effects of imigration on employment, supply of educated labour and 
national income in this fully general case can now be decomposed as the sum of 
I Wis is seen readily as follows. For a unit of emigration, population decreases by l/W-2) 
per cent. On the other hand, national income decreases by k6rN~N2/{N(@z;ILI + &?)I’). The 
fact that the latter may exceed the former can then be readily seen as follows. Let us take the 
special case of the impact of initiating emigration, that is, 2 = 0. If the following, quite 
possible, relationship holds: 
then the relative rate of decrease in national mcome is larger than that of decrease in population, 
thus leading to the reduction of per-capita income. 
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(1) the ciirect effect of migration keeping wage levels constant and (2) the ina’irect 
effect of the resulting wage increases. The latter component is in turn decomposed 
into (I) the effect of the wage increase in the mr-sector and (2) the eflect of a 
wage increase in the m,-sector that it induces. Thus taking the incremeri~ai- 
employment-and-difirenhzl-wage variant, and evaluating for simplicity the 
expression for the initial impact, namely, at the point where 2 = 0, we may 
summarize the expressions for the total effect of emigration as in table 2. 
The following observations, based on these results, are in order concerning the 
effects of emigration of educated labour in odr model. 
(1) Note that the direct effect of emigration on employment in either sector is 
nil. However, if the foreign wage level is taken into account in calculating the 
expected wage (Bv,), this increases the supply of educated labour (Nr) and will 
reduce national income by the incremental educational cost. If the foreign wage 
level (Fit) is high enough, we could also have increased unemployment of 
educated labour and reduced per-capita income. 
(2) The induced wage-increase of educated labour, if any, will work to reduce 
the employment of educated labour. If the elasticity of demand for educated 
labour (qr) is below unity, the supply of educated labour will increase, thus 
increasing unemployment of the educated, both absolutely and relatively; 
further, national incorn- will also be likely to reduce. 
(3) Finally, if we have the leap-frogging process, such that Ez also rises in 
response to the rise in Wr , the effect hereof will be towards reducing the c mploy- 
ment of uneducated labour. This effect would thus work to increase the expected 
wage (Ew,) in this sector (if r12 c 1) and thus to mitigate the increase in the 
supply of educated labour (when ql c 1): the net result could even be to reduce, 
in the new equi”brium, the s.rInly of educated labour. The loss of national 
income would also be reduced insofar as the supply of educated Iabour is 
reduced; however, unless the effect of reducing the cost of education is large, 
it is unlikely that it will offset the loss in national income caused through the 
contraction of output of m, and m2 resulting from the rise in ‘5;. and E, 
respectively. 
Thus, in our model, even without invoking the presence of ‘externalities’ 
(leading to differences between the private and social marginal product of the 
emigrants), we see that the emigration of educated labour can easily lead to 
unfavourable effects on national income, per-capita income and on the un- 
employment (absolute and relative; of educated and uneducated labour through 
the effect of the migration on expected-wage formation in the market for educated 
labour, the upward pull on the (actual) wage of educated labour, and the leap- 
frogging upward pull on the (actual) wage of uneducated labour. And, as we 
proceed now to discuss in more detail in sect. 4, the internalization of the cost 
of education will not necessarily reduce the income-cost of the migration. Nor 
will the payment by the foreign country of the cost of education of the im. 
migrants eliminate the adverse ffect of the migration. 
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4. Alternathe assumptions 
Before we proceed to an explicit welfare analysis of the effects of brain drain 
in sect. 5, w; now sketch briefly the effects of varying some of the assumptions 
in the model of sects. 2 and 3.14 
4.1. Inrernnalizing the cost of education 
The reader may well ask what happens if we let pecple pay for their own 
education, so that the educational cost is ‘internalized”. In this case, instead of 
(I 0), we will have :
Ew,-k* = Ew,, (10’) 
where k* is thl; :;.mount of educational cost that is internalized (k* 5 k). 
Since employment depends on the actual wage, however, the employmen; 
efftlcrs in the model are unchanged whereas the allocation of the labour force 
between the two groups (educated and uneducated) will be directly afIected. 
In consequence, we now have: 
Since it is easy to show that the denominator is positive,” the behaviour of ZV1 
continues, as in the earlier case of free education, to depend on the elasticity of 
demand for labour. 
The resulting impact on the other comparative-statics results established for 
11~ case of free education can be readily worked out by the reader. It may be 
noted, however, that, contrary to general intuition, the internalization of the 
educational cost does not necessarily reduce the undesirable impact effect of the 
brain drain in our model: the welfare impact of an increment in Z, under free 
education (k* = 0) is given by (22) for CaTe I, and under internalized cost by: 
and, in general, when a welfare cost is involved (as when 11~ < 1), the two costs 
cannot be uniquely ranked. 
‘*Incidentally, none of our quantitative conclusions depend on the assumption of allo&ing 
only two sectors. In fact, even in the presence of many sectors, we still obtain: 
(+,/N,)(dN,/d$j == [C/V-Pi,)iRj(l -CQ) 
and 
where 
(w,/N,)(dN,/d+,) = -(Ni/hsM -VI), 
.P -,t N,, for n 2 2. 
-i 
‘5By~10’),wehave:~1Lt+~2 z- L k*(N, -Nz) = nz(L.,/NM+ k*Nz*. 
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Similarly, for Case III, we may note again that the adverse ffect of emigration 
on employment and income is not necessarily reduced if the cost of education is 
internalized as in (10’). Thus, for example, (27) is modified in the case of inter- 
nalized educational cost (k* - k) to: 
dN,/dZ = B,N,/{J,L, + QzL2 + EJ- k(N, - N2)}, (27’) 
and it is clear that the new, additional term -k(N, - N2) could, in principle, 
work in eiti.er direction. Also, eq. (31) for impact on national income would 
modify to: 
dY/dZ = -k~~N,/{~3,L,+~32L2+~SZ-k(N1 -N&. (31’) 
And this means that the effect of internalizing the cost u?’ education could well 
be to irtcrease, rather the_n diminish, the cost in national income from the 
emigration in our model: this being yet another instance of second-best theory. 
All this, of course, is not to deny that, for any gilyen levels of R, , iC2 and 2, the 
progress& internalization of the cost of education will be employment-and- 
income-improving. We can show that the increased internalization of the cost of 
education will, while leaving unchanged the employment in each sectcr, reduce 
the supply of educated labour (NJ and hence its (total) cost (kNJ: 
dNJdk* = -N,N,i{w,(L,/N,)N+K*N,) < 0. (32) 
Therefore, as long as unemployment in educated labour exists, iiicreasing the 
education cost borne by labopr itself will save the education cost by -kdN,. 
Note further that, even if the cost paid by lal-our (i.e., k*) approaches the ‘true 
value’ of k, the unemployment of educated labour may still exist.16 In such a 
case, the imposition of higher cost (k* > k) for education may turn out to be 
optimal in this second-best problem with wage rigidities i” 
4.2. Irreversibility of education 
We may next address ourselves to the question of what happens in the ‘short 
run’ when the educated labour force cannot be reduced. The e&t of this clearly 
is to accentuate - by eliminating the possibility of reducing the educated-labour 
supply, N1, and thus saving on its cost, kN, - the 1.3~~ possibilities in the model. 
lkre is thus no relief for the ‘let-us-not-worry&out-brain-drain’ economists 
from shifting to the short run! 
“Suppose C, ar d 17~ are fixed higher than the equilil. rium full employment wage rate 
indicated by (12). Then the phenomenon discussed in the ter ; c0ult.i readily occur. 
“‘Note again that the saving in educational costs, which we have been discussing, app te?i 
only in the ‘long ru I’, for comparison of two stationary stab. 5 in our model. 
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4.3. The case where the labour market in m,-sector is competitive 
Next, what happens if the ‘uneducated-labour’ sector is ‘competirive’, so thal: 
the sticky-wage assumption applies orlly to educated labour? In this case, 
instead of (10) we will now have :
&/a;W, = w2, (IO”) 
and 
N, = Lp 
Further, since w2 is no longer fixed, it will now be determined by : 
w2 =&h g’<O. 
Finally, we will have the total labour supply constraint as: 
N,+N, = m. 
Solving these four equations, we would then get now: 
dN,;ldi$ = L,(f - tl~)/(% -N,g’), (33) 
and it is easy to see that (33) has the same qualitative property as (16) in our 
basic model in sects. 2 and 3.” 
4.4. Cost of education pcrid by country of immigration 
It is sometimes asserted that if the host country pays the cost of education, 
brain drain would cease to be harmful. In uur model, this is easily allowed for, 
of course, by assuming that ihe country of emigration recovers (kdZ\ worth of 
transfer income from the country of immigration. It is again easy to see, as 
already noted in sect. 3, that all this does is to modify the last row of table 2 by 
the addition of the term (kdZ) and that the net effect on income, and the effects 
on unemployment, can still be adverse. 
5. Welfare &e&s of brain draia and integration of markets for professionals 
We may now draw togetner the main analytical results of sect. 3 to derive 
welfare condusions. To do this, hotwever, we need to specify the social welfare 
function explicitly. 
It is our contention that the traditional trade-theoretic analysis of the Grubel- 
Scott-Johuson variety yields conclusions more favourable to the phenomenon of 
brain drsin and integration of markets for professionals, not. merely because 
‘“Et n’ay he interc5ting to note, however, that the change in 6~ will now endogenously 
charngcw,;And,inthecasewhercr7, -z l,dwz/disI = -g’(dNi/dwl) > 0,sincedN2 = -dNl, 
so that a rise in 0, leads to a rise in w2, This k, of course, not the same as the ‘lea.p-irogging’ 
in our Case II, a pbenomenon that is ruled out by the ‘competitive’ assumption for section mz . 
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the model used for analysis is simplistic. It is also beLause the social welfare 
function used for analysis is really limited in confining itself to arguments which 
rule out many relevant variables. 
In fact, we think that it could make much sense to define a social welfare 
function which has at least the following arguments: 
(I) I?ational income: The sense of security, bargaining power in trade and 
economic negotiations, the need for defense, and a number of political tnd 
economic variables of importance could depend, not just on per-capita income, 
but on national income as an aggregate. 
(2) Level ofemigration: Those who have lived in the less developed countries 
know that the emigration of skilled manpower in certain occupations, such as 
scientific research in particular, creates a sense of inadequacy, which rnE:, stiftle 
creative endeavour in domestic environment. 
(3) Level of edttcared/professional marlpower: The technological ability of tile 
population may mattt;* much to the independence and creativity of the popula- 
tion; hence a fall in the (short-run and long-run) level of the edueated labour 
force due to the phenomena being discussed by us could cause an adverso effect 
on social welfare. 
(4) Unemployment: Unemployment, whether absolute or its rate, is also of 
importance to social welfare. More directly, it affects political stability and 
social cohesion, if nothing else, and is of immediate concern to the developing 
countries. In this regard, the unemployment among the educated may be even 
more explos! de than among the uneducated, as is evident from the fact that the 
leadership of the revolutionary movements in Calcutta, for example, has derive ’ 
from the unemployed, educated students. 
(5) Incor~tc disrribution: In the absence of fiscal ability to redistribute incomes, 
the direct income distributional impact of the phenomena under discussion will 
also often be the final effect. And it should clearly enter the social welfare 
function. In the context of our model, we could thus include in the arguments of 
the social welfare function, for example, the relative share of wage income in 
total national income: (EIL1 + iG2L,)/ Y.19 
Thus, a realistic social welfare function should probably read as follows: 
We forego a taxonomic exercise, exploring the outcomes on welfare and 
possible tmdeoffs among alternative arguments in this welfare function., for 
different parametric ombinations of the elasticities ql, q2 and other paranleters 
such as 0 and k appearing in the expressions in table 2. The reader can readily 
‘gAlternatively, we could use as an argument he weighted sum of per-capita utilities: e.g. 
where U(q) is the per-capita utility in Iabour class i with 111’ > 3 and II” c 0, the social welfare 
function could have the argument: C U,(w&. 
i 
do this for himself; and we have already discussed briefly in sect. 3 some qf the 
possible outcomes with regard to national income, per capita income: supplj~ CJf 
educated labour and the level and rates of unenrploymcnt in both classes of 
!abour.20 
Emigration tax 
Rather, we :may sketch here the answer to the question as to what would 
happen if the country of emigration were to impose a tax on emigration. To 
anaiyse this policy, assume that a recurring poll tax (that would be paid annually 
by the migrant) is levied on each emigram2r Restricting our analysis to the 
effect on the income of those left behind (for reasons of space), we should expect 
a twofold effect: (i) the direct effect of the tax on revenue, which may then be 
treated as income redistributed to those left behind; and (ii) the indirect effect 
on unemployment levels, income, etc., which would operate through the effects 
on expected and actuai wage levels. 
(i) If we take Tas the (recurring) poll tax paid by the emigrants (Z), the tax 
revenue will be TZ. As Tis changed, this revenue will change by: 
w --6), (35) 
where I); is the elasticity of emigratic;r with respect to the poll tax (i.e., 
- T/Z*dZ/dT). Clearly, this revenue effect will be positiy:e or negative, depending 
on the elasticity of emigration with respect o taxation. 
(ii) As for the ‘indirect’ effect, this can be indicated tlia the simplified Cr:se III 
assumption of the increnzental-en?ployment-and-di~~rential-rl,age variant : i.e., 
by assuming that (only) the expected wage is modified downwards by the tax. 
Thus, we must rewrite (29) as follows: 
(29’) 
Z”The only effects, which we have not worked out in sect. 3, relate to income distri’lution. 
This, however, can be readily worked out. Thus, for the general Case IV, we can write: 





k(l -q,)N,N,’ dz, 
KQR I 22 
21The effect of the usual poll tax wouid be of a once-for-all nature. However, in order to 
conform to our analysis in terms of flows, it would be useful to conceive of a recurring poll 
tax along the lines of the Bhagwati-Dellalfar (1973) proposal (which relates to an iacome tax 
related to the incornle of the emigrant, a diflerence of unimportance if we assume a unique G). 
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Substituting (29’) into (10) and differentiating with respect o T, we obtain 
dN, N,Z-- Nz(Wp - T;(dZ/dT) -=- 
dT i$L, + W2L2 + (F$ - T)Z ’ 
which can be written as 
dN, WV + d -=- 
dT W,L1ci?zLz+(G3,-T)Z =Z ” 
‘where .sf is the elasticity of emigration with respect o effective foreign wages 
(wr - T).’ 2 Thus an increase in T will always decrease the supply of educated 
labour in the long run, and this effect is strengthened if the emigrant is responsive 
to the recurring poll tax. As before, the income change is then: 
dY _kdN’ kN,Z( 1 + EJ -= 
dT dT= EJq + i&L2 + (ii+ - T)Z 
> 43. (37) 
Thus, the net impact on the income of those left behind will be given by the sum 
of these two, direct and indirect, effects (36) and (37): . 
z(l-++ 
kN,Z( 1 + EC) 
i$L, + w,L, + (K+ - T)Z ’ (38) 
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the per capita income of those left 
behind to improve thanks to the emigration tax, therefore, would be that 
tj$ < 1.23 
The reader could readily extend the analysis of the poll tax on emigration to 
examine the impact on the other arguments in the social welfare function; space 
considerations prevent us from undertaking this task ourselves. 
6. Concluding remarks 
It is clear; of course, that our results are in contrast with those of the tradi- 
tional, fully neoclassical model because of the assumptions of ‘rigid’ wages and 
resulting unemployment. Under the conventional assumptions of flexible wages 
and absence of unemployment, he results of emigration are both simpler and 
easily stated : (i) for internalized cost of education (k* = k), the emigration will 
reduce national income but, in increasing the average product of labour, will 
also raise per-capita income under the ‘normal’ assumption of diminishing 
“Note that (&- T/T)qrT = cf. 
23Note that the ‘indirect’ effect works only in the long run. Furthermore, we have ruled out 
the more general case where the emigration may affect the actual wage as well. If this were 
allowed, then the emigration tax might well reduce the actual wage in the ml, and possibly m2. 
sectors and hence moderate the income loss OII that account. 
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marginal pr;oductivity of labour ;2 * and (ii) for free education, (k* = 0), the 
other polar case, and no compensation for educational cost by ihe country of 
immigration, it is possible (though not inevitable) that the wer;ge product of 
labour, and hence per-cap.ita income, falls as a result of emigration of educated 
labour. 
Our results are both more complex and less comforting l;han these. They are 
also more realistic. They should suffice to raise doubts about &he complacency 
concerning the brain drain phenomenon resulting from the analysis in the 
existing literature2 ’
z4The apparent contradiction between this statement and the earlier Grubel-Scott argument 
that emigration leaves unchanged the welfare of those left behind is easily resolved. The 
Grubel-Scott result is based on the fact that the emigre was earning w (the wage) and thus 
everyone other than him was getting (Y-w), whereas his departare reduces Y itself by w: 
hence the result for those left behind is the sum of the reduction in income due to emigration 
(dY/dL = -w) and the increment in available income as the emigrant loses his claim on 
income defined by his wage (+ w), which means no-impact. O,n the other hand, d( Y:‘L)i;dL = 
(l/L)[w-(Y/l;)] *> 0 as the wage, which equals the marginal product, will be below the 
average product: hence emigration will raise per-capita income., i.e. improce the welfare of those 
left behind. This contradiction is easily resolved, however, once it is seen that the Cirubel-Scott 
argument assumes that the income accruing to the emigre prior to emigration is art’, the wage, 
whereas the per-capita-income argument in effect assumes it ta be Y/IX> w): the former 
assumption thus yields no impact whereas the latter yields improvement, for those left behind. 
In this paper, we have examined the impact on both income and per-capita incorme; results 
under the Grubcl-Scott assumption can however be readily derived by taking the impact on 
income and adding to it the consumption of the emigrant, defined as his wage rate !I?~), on the 
assumption that the emigrant was employed prior to emigration, or possibly a lower sum if we 
assume that he was unemployed and was. subsisting cn someone else’s income. 
lSWe have not modelled here, as an anonymous referee has pointed out, some of the real- 
world complexities which arise on a different din-.Pnsion from those (e.g. sticky Lvages and 
unemployment) considered in this paper: for example, the effects of the quality and content of 
higher education and professional training in the advanced countries on the phenomenon of 
brain drain. Thus, it is well known that the brair. drain occurs in part L;ia the settling down 
abroad of LDC students who have been receiving hrgher education abroad. To some estcnt, 
this phenomenon results from the fact that the t:‘l,: of training received abroad makes these 
student: somewhat ill-suited at times to any useful )i ork at home and, if they do return, makes 
them conduits of disequilibrating disturbances iu the domestic economy. We would riced 
however a different model to study these kinds of relationships and effects: to admit everything 
into one model would be to make it too compiex. 
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